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The Action was outside the Courts 
Consumer Injuries and the Uses of Contract 
in the United States, 1875-1945 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR. 
The legal history of personal injury claims in late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century America lies not only in the law of torts 
but equally, if not more importantly, in the law of contracts. The 
bulk of that history, moreover, lies not in formal judgments of 
courts but in private decisions of injury victims to waive, settle, or 
abandon their claims without judicial resolution. A major part of 
that out-of-court process, in turn, consisted not of freely bargained 
agreements that occurred randomly but rather of pressured set-
tlements that were harvested systematically. To a large and insuf-
ficiently unexplored extent, the legal history of personal injury 
claims lies in the organized release-seeking practices of thousands 
upon thousands of corporate lawyers, doctors, and claim agents 
who secured quick and low-cost settlements in countless numbers 
of homes, streets, offices, roadways, factories, vehicles, and hospi-
tals where injury victims and their families were found. 
The years from the 1870s to the 1940s constituted a distinct 
period in the development of corporate settlement practices. 
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a rapid increase 
in commercially related accidents and the emergence of a plain-
tiffs' personal injury bar coincided with the nationalization of the 
economy and the rationalization of corporate management tech-
niques to spur a systematic use of releases to pre-empt potential 
tort claims. By the end of the century the methodical and aggres-
sive new practices were in widespread use. Then, in the early years 
of the twentieth century, continued expansion of the plaintiffs' 
personal injury bar and the growth of labour unions and con-
sumer groups increased the de facto access of tort victims to 
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counsel, while popular attitudes increasingly supported the idea 
that injured persons should be more fully compensated. Both 
courts and legislatures moved to strengthen the legal position of 
those who sought to sue corporate defendants. Beginning in the 
1920s, the numbers of commercially related accidents declined, 
and insurance coverage expanded rapidly, spreading costs, bring-
ing financial predictability, and decreasing the pressure on corpo-
rations to terminate adverse tort claims for the barest possible 
amounts. By the mid-twentieth century, corporate settlement 
practices-especially those of large insurance companies and 
their well-protected clients-had become increasingly bureau-
cratized and routinized. The result was to moderate some of the 
companies' most objectionable practices, raise the general level of 
compensation paid, and increase somewhat the regularity with 
which the de facto tort compensation system operated. 
A consideration of corporate release-seeking practices high-
lights a major gap that has marked the history of personal injury 
litigation. From the turn of the century corporate spokespersons 
decried the work of 'ambulance chasers' and complained about 
a purported flood of frivolous and fraudulent claims. 1 Many 
lawyers and bar associations joined the attack, denouncing the 
'abuses' fostered by contingent fee agreements and the ethical fail-
ures of personal injury attorneys. Similarly, much contemporary 
law and economics literature follows the same track, focusing on 
frivolous 'strike' and 'nuisance' suits. 2 While such commentary has 
raised important issues, it has also largely ignored significant ele-
ments of the de facto litigation and settlement process. One, for 
example, is the abusive tactics that corporations utilized. '[W]hen 
we are for the defendant', explained one corporate lawyer, 'nothil).g 
can start us. ' 3 They delayed cases, raised frivolous defences, filed 
excessive motions and appeals, and tried numerous other similar 
tactics to compound plaintiffs' burdens and raise their costs. 
Another element often ignored is the fraudulent and unethical 
1 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial 
America, 1870-1958 (New York, 1992), 150-4 and sources cited therein. 
2 See, e.g., Lucien Aryc Bebchuk, 'Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer', Journal 
ef Legal Studies, 17 (1988), 437-50. 
3 Quoted in Sol M. Linowitz, The Betrayed Prqfession: Lawyering at the End ef the Twentieth 
Century (New York, 1992), 25. On the importance of building a litigation 'reputation', see, 
e.g., Samuel R. Gross and Kent D. Syverud, 'Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Nego-
tiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial', Michigan Law Review, 90 (1991), 319-93. 
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behaviour of defendants. From 1889 to 1902, for example, the 
Metropolitan Street Railway Company of New York paid thou-
sands of dollars in bribes to doctors, witnesses, court personnel, 
and police officers in order to defeat countless numbers of 
claimants. Eventually, after its practices were exposed, the 
company admitted that its legal department had been 'a perjury 
mill'. 4 A third such element, which this essay explores, is the 
methodical solicitation of inequitable out-of-court settlements. 
Indeed, corporate release-seeking practices helped stimulate-
even necessitated-'ambulance chasing'. If plaintiffs' lawyers did 
not reach injury victims quickly, corporate agents would have their 
signatures on releases. No adequate understanding of the litiga-
tion and settlement process is possible without a consideration of 
such social factors. 
Consumers and claiming 
In the decades around the turn of the century industrial accidents 
caused approximately 35,000 deaths and almost 2 million injuries 
per year.5 For 'consumers' as a growing and identifiable social 
group, injuries resulted from contacts with a nearly infinite variety 
of objects, products, vehicles, activities, and facilities. For half a 
century the railroads injured 5,000-10,000 passengers every year 
and annually caused the death of several hundred more.6 In the 
decade from 1887 to 1896 streetcars in New York City averaged 
some 140 accidents per year, while,in Boston trolley accidents rose 
from just over 200 in 1887 to more \han 1,700 in 1900.7 Other new 
urban services similarly caused untold numbers of accidents. Gas 
and electricity accounted for twenty-eight deaths in Boston in 1900, 
and gas alone caused 142 deaths in New York City ten years later.8 
4 In re Robinson, 136 NYS 548 (App. Div. 1st NY 1912), qj]irmed 103 NE 160 (Ct. App. NY 
1913); New York State Bar Association, 'Report of Committee on Contingent Fees', Pro-
ceedings ef the Thirty-First Annual Meeting (1908), 121. 
5 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History ef American Law (2nd edn., New York, 1985), 482. 
r; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics ef 
the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, 1975), pt. 2, 740. 
7 W. J. Clark, 'A Chapter of Accidents', Street Railway Journal, 13 (Oct. 1897), 667-70, 
669; Robert A. Silverman, Law and Urban Growth: Civil Litigation in the Boston Trial Courts, 
1880-1900 (Princeton, 1981), 101. 
8 Silverman, Law and Urban Growth, 108; Randolph E. Bergstrom, Courting Danger: Injury 
and Law in .New York City, 1870-1910 (Ithaca, NY, 1992), 51. 
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Although the conditions of late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century life created literally millions of potential tort 
claims, the courts disposed of relatively few of them. Most never 
became lawsuits, and a majority of those that did were settled 
without final legal judgment. In one way or another, out-of-court 
resolutions accounted for more than 90 per cent of all potential 
tort claims and well over half of those that were filed in court. 9 
There are few reliable statistics, but it seems likely that, com-
pared to injured workers, at least, consumers as a group converted 
a somewhat higher-though still relatively small-percentage of 
their potential claims into lawsuits and may have prosecuted a 
slightly higher percentage of those suits to judgment. 1° Consumers 
were generally free from the kinds of social and economic pres-
sures that corporate employers used so effectively to discourage 
suits by their own employees, 11 and they often had little to lose 
and much to gain, especially if their injuries were serious and 
contingent fee arrangements allowed them counsel. Further, again 
as compared to injured workers, consumers occupied a more 
favoured legal position. They did not have to confront the daunt-
ing fellow-servant defence, and they could often avoid difficult evi-
dentiary problems by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Finally, some consumers-principally passengers on elevators and 
escalators, amusement park rides, taxicabs, railroads, streetcars, 
and buses-enjoyed an especially favoured position. Common 
carriers owed them not merely the standard duty of 'reasonable 
care' but rather a much more rigorous duty of 'the highest care'. 
That higher standard meant tl;rnt injured passengers could more 
commonly and economically.,Prove the carriers' liability. More-
over, in the frequent cases that involved collisions, derailments, 
explosions, and other mechanical failures, carriers were deprived 
of two of their most powerful defences, contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk. 
'' Frank M. Munger, Jr., 'Miners and Lawyers: Law Practice and Class Conflict in 
Appalachia, 1872-1920', in Maureen Cain and Christine B. Harrington (eds.), Uiwyers in a 
Postmodern World: Translation and Tran1gressio11 (New York, 1994), 185-228, 2IO, 228 n. 42; 
Purcell, Litigation and Inequality, 32-3, 259-60. 
10 Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th 
Century', American Bar Foundation Research Journal (1987), 351-77, 367. 
11 Social and economic vulnerability and the fear of employer retaliation made workers 
extremely reluctant to sue their employers for tort compensation. Munger, 'Miners and 
Lawyers', 209-11, 227 n. 40, 228 n. 43; Purcell, Litigation and Inequality, 37-42. 
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Corporate defendants: incentives and leverage 
Whatever the exact percentage who brought suit, corporate defen-
dants worked painstakingly to keep as many tort victims as possi-
ble out of court. A handbook for railroad accountants emphasized 
the importance of settling claims without judicial involvement. 
While a corporate legal staff handled a variety of problems, it 
explained, a 'very large part of its duty is to effect settlement of 
disputes outside of court,' especially in 'personal injury' cases. 12 A 
streetcar company announced bluntly that its policy was 'to settle 
all accident cases promptly, and never allow them to reach the 
courts if we can possibly prevent it'. 13 
Powerful economic incentives spurred corporate efforts to settle 
out of court. Potential tort claims threatened regular and sub-
stantial economic exposure.'+ Transportation companies, in par-
ticular, had compelling economic incentives to settle adverse 
claims. They tended to be involved in large numbers of personal 
injuries, and often their fault was clear and no legal defence avail-
able. In such cases out-of-court settlements constituted the best-
and perhaps only-opportunity to resolve claims for relatively 
minimal amounts. 15 Further, railroad and streetcar companies 
were often under acute financial pressure, and they sought avidly 
to trim their variable costs wherever possible. 
An additional economic incentive may also have inspired cor-
porate settlement efforts. Some scholars have maintained that 
common law judges sought economically 'efficient' results. They 
maintain, that is, that the courts tended to hold defendants liable 
for negligence only when the 'costs' of preventing an injury were 
less than the 'costs' of the injury itself discounted by its likelihood 
of occurrence. If they are right, that common law dynamic 
created a compelling economic incentive for corporate defendants 
to press for minimal settlements. For, by holding down settle-
ment amounts generally, they could help create and maintain a 
widespread perception that the 'costs' of injuries-a subjective, 
socially generated criterion-were and should be quite low. By 
" J. Shirley Eaton, Handbook ef Railroad Expenses (New York, 1913), 197-8. 
13 Quoted in Friedman, 'Civil Wrongs', at 371. 
11 Sec, e.g., M. L. Byers, Economics qf Railway Operation (New York, 1908), 566-9; Eaton, 
Handbook, 81-83, Il5-17, 187-91, 197-8. 
15 Friedman, 'Civil Wrongs', at 375; Bergstrom, Courting Danger, at 158-60. 
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minimizing the generally perceived 'costs' of injuries they could 
ensure that the applicable negligence formula would shrink the scope 
of their potential liability and thereby reduce the overall number 
of cases where the law would require them to pay damages. 16 
Driven to minimize the cost of claims, corporate defendants 
came quickly to recognize the advantages of out-of-court settle-
ments. Most fundamental, they learned that such settlements 
could often be arranged easily and cheaply if accomplished imme-
diately after an accident. Victims were frequently in no condition 
to negotiate knowingly or effectively. Often they were alone, in 
shock or pain, disoriented and frightened, and ignorant of both 
their legal options and the extent of their injuries. Above all, their 
immediate and overwhelming concern was to obtain proper 
medical treatment. The victim of a Santa Fe Railway collision, 
for example, who had received cuts, bruises, a broken leg, and a 
fractured skull, signed a release in the railroad's hospital four days 
after the accident. The victim 'did not seem to care' about 'the 
matter of dollars and cents', the agent who secured the agreement 
testified. 'All he wanted was to have proper care.' 17 Sometimes, 
injury victims were preoccupied with the condition of another 
member of their family who had also been injured. Sometimes, 
they were emotionally shaken but deeply relieved-and therefore 
pliable-because they had apparently not been injured more seri-
ously. 'I was glad to save my life,' explained one injured worker 
who signed a release shortly after his injury. 18 An insurance 
company official acknowledged the obvious. 'In settling claims 
considerable money can be saved if done in the early stages before 
the case falls into the hands of an attorney.' 19 
While corporations held overwhelming advantages in dealing 
with accident victims immediately after their injury, they also had 
other advantages they could use against those who resisted settle-
ment. First, corporations learned that most injury victims were 
unable to bear the burdens of litigation. If companies insisted on 
'" Sec, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 'A Theory of Negligence', Journal ef Legal Studies, l (1972), 
29. Cf. Bergstrom, Courting Danger, 167-96. 
17 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Cunningham, 54 P. w55, w57 (Sup. Ct. Kan. 
1898). 
111 United States House of Representatives, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 ef the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary ef the House ef Representatives, Bo Cong., l sess. (1947), 72. 
19 Quoted in Roy Lubovc, 'Workmen's Compensation and the Prerogatives of Volun-
tarism', Labor History, 8 (1967), 254, 26o n. 15. 
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their non-liability while making low settlement offers, they could 
compel injured individuals to choose between a quick, easy, and 
cost-free resolution and a risky, expensive, and protracted litiga-
tion. They knew that potential plaintiffs were balked by any 
number of practical obstacles: psychological inability to face con-
frontation, ignorance of the judicial system, fear of the company 
or its representatives, unfamiliarity with-or deep distrust of--
lawyers, a desperate need for money to pay medical expenses and 
provide for their families, knowledge that attorneys' fees would 
consume much of any award they might win, the costs of retain-
ing expert witnesses and locating and assuring the timely appear-
ance of fact witnesses, the innumerable risks and uncertainties 
involved in litigation and trial, the costs and delays of the nearly 
inevitable appeal that would follow any plaintiff's victory, and, 
finally, the cumulating personal and family pressures that years of 
waiting for a final legal judgment could generate.20 By the late 
nineteenth century corporate defendants had learned that those 
pressures would combine relentlessly to make most claimants 
falter and eventually succumb to discounted settlement offers. 
They understood, in short, the uses and forms of strategic cost 
imposition. 21 
Second, corporations also learned to use their economic.lever-
age. They had relatively fixed legal costs and handled large 
numbers of cases and, consequently, were able to spread the 
higher costs of the relatively few cases they chose to litigate over 
the much larger number they settled. In contrast, individual 
claimants bore the entire cost of their litigations and had to pay 
for them out of whatever proceeds resulted from their single suit. 
Moreover, because corporate defendants had legal costs that were 
budgeted, relatively fixed, and spread over a large base, they were 
not subject to significant economic pressure by any action that an 
adversary might take in filing, litigating, trying, or appealing a 
20 See, e.g., Austin Sarat, 'Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey 
Evidence', Law and Sociery Review, 11 (1977), 427-88, 436, 448-52, 464-5, 466-72; David M. 
Engel, 'Cases, Conflict, and Accommodation: Patterns of Legal Interaction in an Ameri-
can Community', American Bar Foundation Research Journal (1983), 803-74, 816-22, 851; 
Purcell, Litigation and lnequaliry, chs. 2 and 3. 
21 Kathleen Engelmann and Bradford Cornell, 'Measuring the Cost of Corporate Lit-
igation: Five Case Studies', Journal ef Legal Studies, 17 (1988), 377-99; Keith N. Hylton, 'Lit-
igation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law', Universiry ef Miami Law Review, 46 
(1991), 111-48. 
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claim. Further, knowing that most claims would ultimately settle, 
they could generally be indifferent to the fate of any individual 
case, 22 a position that strengthened their resolve to stand firm on 
low settlement offers. Finally, their permanent legal staffs and sub-
stantially lowered per-case costs meant that corporate defendants 
could, when necessary, allocate extensive resources to litigate spe-
cific and troublesome disputes. That capability, in turn, enabled 
them to drive up the costs of those claimants who chose to liti-
gate seriously-thereby devaluing their claims-and to increase 
their own chances of winning in court.23 Corporations utilized, 
in short, the strategic advantages they held as the least costly 
litigators. 
To obtain quick releases, corporate defendants organized 
special claims departments and retained networks of agents across 
the country. 'These cases constitute so regular and large a group, 
and are so nearly similar', explained a railroad accounting 
handbook, 'that they result in specialization with regular staffs 
to handle them.'24 One of the first responsibilities of a corporate 
legal staff, announced a study of railroad economics, was '[t]he 
settling of claims for personal injury'.25 A streetcar company 
explained that it instructed its agents to 'hunt up' injury victims, 
get in their 'good graces', and 'insist on paying [them] something' 
to get their signatures on releases. 26 
Those regular staffs and individual agents enjoyed wide discre-
tion in conducting their operations. They had one clear goal-to 
obtain quick and inexpensive settlements-and one clear test of 
success-whether or not they got the desired releases. They could 
choose their tactics, adapt their approach to any situation, and 
22 Corporate attorneys would ensure the settlement--generously, if necessary-of suits 
that were legally or prudentially indefensible or that threatened to alter the law in an 
unfavourable direction. See, e.g., Wayne V Mcintosh, The Appeal of Civil Law: A Political-
&onomic Ana!Jisis of Litigation (Urbana, Ill. 1990), 146. 
"' Sec Stanton Wheeler, Bliss Cartwright, Robert A. Kagan, and Lawrence M. Fried-
man, 'Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 
1870-1970', Law and Society Review, 21 (1987), 403-45, 439-40; Mcintosh, Appeal of Civil Law, 
146, 150·-1. For defendants' legal/ economic advantages, see Robert D. Cooter and Daniel 
L. RubinfCld, 'Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and their Resolution', Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 27 (1989), rn67, rn73-4; Martin J. Bailey and Paul H. Rubin, 'A Positive 
Theory of Legal Change', International Review of Law and Economics, 14 (1994) 467-77. 
24 Eaton, Handbook, 197-8. Compare R. W. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, 
1825-1875 (Oxford, 1994), app., 373-88. 
"'' Byers, Economics of Railway Operation, 566. 
26 Quoted in Friedman, 'Civil Wrongs', at 371. 
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rely on the fact that their statements would go unrecorded. Their 
positions gave them both the opportunity and incentive to pres-
sure claimants immediately, vigorously, and tenaciously. Their 
employers profited from their successes and had little or no eco-
nomic incentive to supervise them closely or to restrain their 
tactics. Individual tort claimants held no significance as regular 
customers or suppliers, and they seldom possessed any social or 
economic leverage against their corporate adversaries. Neither the 
companies nor their agents had any noticeable incentive to culti-
vate their goodwill. The companies devoted few resources to con-
strain their agents, and the agents quickly learned the most 
efficient methods available to bring in the largest number of set-
tlements at the lowest possible cost. 27 
Practice 
Reported release cases do not merely state the law. They also 
record something quite different: the operation of an alternative 
corporate legal process-massive, organized, profitable, and 
largely invisible to the public. 28 They reveal the companies' stan-
dard tactics, their frequent successes, and the substantial savings 
they reaped. They suggest, further, both the relative unimportance 
of substantive legal norms and the decisive importance 'of the 
27 Economic and rational choice th<:ories support this conclusion. Sec, e.g., Cooter and 
Rubinfeld, 'Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes', w78--86. See Carl Gcrsuny, Work 
Hazards and Industrial Coriflict (Hanover, NH, 1981). 
28 There was an interesting split in the period's legal literature. Judges and practi-
tioners frequently referred to organized and aggressive agent tactics, but the university law 
reviews were largcly silent on the subject. Revealingly, when the law reviews discussed 
releases, they did so with an almost exclusive focus on matters of doctrine and 'logic'. 
Indeed, they directed most of their efforts to a critique of a single topic, the 'joint tort-
fcasors rule'. Obviously dysfunctional and unfair, the rule lent itself readily to a sharp doc-
trinal critique; e.g., note, Harvard Law Review, 28 (1915), 802-4; note, Yale Law Journal, 28 
(1918), 90-1; Michigan Law Review, 18 (1920), 680-+ Only rarely, and well after the turn of 
the century, did the law reviews discuss the significance of organized corporate release 
practices: e.g., note, Univmiry ef Chicago Law Review, 5 (1938), 455-63. This difference 
between the courts and the law reviews suggests, again, that legal 'formalism' was a rela-
tively limited phenomenon, that the bench was generally sensitive to the law's social 
context, and that there was much less congruence than often assumed between the 'men-
talities' of some 'high formalists' on the one hand (e.g. the discussion of releases in Samuel 
Willston, The Law ef Contracts, vol. iii (New York, 1929), 3138-208) and large numbers of 
judges and practitioners on the other. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., review of G. Edward 
White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Journal ef Southern History, 61 (1995), 620, 622. 
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social characteristics of the parties in determining who received 
compensation and how much they received. 
The single most obvious and important characteristic of cor-
porate practices was the sheer speed with which claim agents 
acted. Repeatedly, the courts criticized their 'unseemly haste'. 29 
Claim agents, declared a lawyers' magazine in 1905, 'fly with 
the wings of an eagle to the scene of the accident'. 30 The Vice-
President of the American Electric Railway Association acknowl-
edged that corporations sought 'the immediate settlement of 
accidents and damages'. Indeed, companies should provide their 
claims agents with a ready cash 'Working Fund', he advised, so 
that their agents could settle cases without having to 'wait until 
the regular check and voucher can be received'. 31 The railroads 
sometimes held trains in place until their claims agents arrived 
and secured the desired releases. One court, for example, criti-
cized a railroad for 
[h]olding the train, sending for a law agent to make a settlement before 
any medical or other attention was given [the injured person], and when 
she was suffering from [a concussion of the brain and spine], and, if con-
scious, giving her attention to her little, bleeding grandson. 32 
The railroads took injured passengers to company hospitals 
where their claim agents had ready access to them; they placed 
agents on board their trains to secure releases from them while 
they travelled; and they stationed agents in waiting at passengers' 
down-line transfer or destination points. Railroad, streetcar, 
taxicab, and bus companies took injured passengers to depots or 
company offices or tracked them to nearby hospitals or doctors' 
offices. Within days of accidents-sometimes hours-agents 
arrived at the doors of injured persons' homes or resting places 
seeking their signatures on releases. Immediate contact with 
injured persons and control of the post-injury situation was 
designed to exploit the uncertainty, confusion, and anguish that 
followed in the immediate wake of personal injuries. In 1908 the 
New York State Bar Association castigated 
''' e.g. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 120, 134 (1884). 
30 Editorial note, Virginia Law Register, 11 (1905), 843. 
31 lrville Augustus May, Street Railway Accounting: A Manual ef Operating Practice far Electric 
Railways (New York, 1917), 253. 
32 Southern Railway Co. in Kentucky v. Brewer, 105 SW 160, 163 (Ct. App. Ky. 1907). 
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the practice, now become notorious, of unscrupulous agents of railroad 
corporations seeking out injured persons, and, through chicanery and 
fraud, obtaining from them, in the moment of their pain and suffering, 
releases on insufficient consideration. 33 
The releases that such victims signed were almost invariably for 
steeply discounted amounts, often for small or wholly token 
payments. 
Incessant pressure was the second major characteristic of cor-
porate settlement practices. Agents hounded potential claimants 
to sign releases. They pressured them with repeated visits to their 
hospitals and homes; they told them that they had to leave town 
and that there could be no settlement if the victims waited; and 
they persistently pressed them to sign releases regardless of their 
feelings, prior refusals, and uncertain medical conditions. 'The 
agent of the company who approached [an injured passenger] 
was notified by her nurses and attendants that she was not in 
a mental and physical condition to attend to any business', the 
Supreme Court of Georgia explained in one case, 'but he insisted 
on an interview or settlement.'34 The Eighth Circuit described 
the case of an injured man in the hospital under the influence of 
narcotics: 
Three or four days after the accident, while this [narcotics] treatment 
was going on, and while his arms were suspended over a rope stretched 
across his bed in order to relieve the pressure upon his injured spine, and 
when he was tortured and racked with physical pain (when not under 
the influence of opiates), the defendant's agents found their way into his 
sickroom, from which his friends and all others, save his nurses, had been 
excluded, by order of his physician. 35 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court described the actions of an agent 
who secured a release from a 66-year-old woman by making a 
number of false representations: 
He succeeded in getting her to sign by high-pressure methods during 
a siege at her bedside in the hospital, from 7:30 to 9:30 p.m., within 
seventy-five hours after she had been injured. She was badly shocked, 
33 New York State Bar Association, 'Report of Committee on Contingent Fees', Pro-
ceedings ef the Thirty-First Annual Meeting (1908), rn3. 
34 Smith v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 6z SE 673, 674 (Sup. Ct. Ga. 1908). 
35 Union Pacific Railwqy Co. v. Harris, 63 F. 800, 803 (CCA 8th 1894), qffirmed 158 US 326 
(1895). 
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and grievously hurt, her hip was fractured, the pain was excruciating, 
she was dazed, confused, mortified, and embarrassed ... While she was 
in an exhausted and distressed condition, packed in sand bags to keep 
her hip immobile, and racked with pain and under the influences of 
sedatives and hypnotics, the adjuster, whom she had never known, 
entered her room without her permission.36 
Agents of one railroad secured a release by making the injured 
person's mark and having him touch the pen while he 'was lying 
in his bed, the morning after his foot had been amputated, under 
the influence of opiates'.37 Another agent persuaded a doctor to 
suspend his examination and treatment of an injured passenger-
who 'was suffering severe pain' -while he secured his signature 
on a release. 38 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that 
another claimant 'was in the hospital, suffering from his injuries, 
and was unconscious, at the time it is alleged the release was 
signed by him'. 39 
The third major characteristic of corporate settlement practices 
was their methodical and often ruthless opportunism. Agents 
reached agreements not only with persons suffering great phy-
sical and emotional distress, but also with those who were elderly, 
illiterate, unable to speak or understand the English language, and 
under the influence of some type of drug or alcohol given as a 
painkiller. They attempted to deal with injured persons while they 
were alone, often trying to keep others out of the room while they 
obtained their signatures. Some succeeded in getting releases from 
parties with attorneys by dealing with them alone and without 
their attorneys' knowledge. One railroad treated a female pas-
senger, gave her narcotics, and placed her on a train in a locked 
car with several of its agents.40 
Claim agents used a variety of dubious techniques. They offen~d 
jobs with the company and promised to 'take care of' victims if 
their injuries proved more serious than they appeared. They tried 
to divide potential claimants and use them against one another. 
They apparently switched or misrepresented documents or altered 
3
" Allison v. Wm. Doerflinger Co., 242 NW 558, 561 (Sup. Ct. Wisc. 1932). 
37 Jones v. Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Co., 16 So. 379, 380 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1894). 
38 Spring/ieUJ Consolidated Railway Co. v. Picket, 125 Ill. App. 519 (Ct. App. 3d Ill. 1906). 
39 McCaw v. Union Traction Co., 54 A. 893, 895 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1903). 
40 St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Co. v. Phillips, 66 F. 35, 37-8 (CCA 8th 
1895). 
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the terms of the agreements they had negotiated when they pre-
sented written releases for signature. A street railway employee told 
an injured woman that 'she would be kicked off the car' unless she 
signed a release,41 while a claim agent bought a victim six drinks 
in a bar before obtaining his signature.42 Another agent used 
the captivating lure of, literally, a pile of money. He 'came to the 
meeting with a general release all prepared, except filling blanks, 
and with 100 $5 bills, which at some time during the negotiation 
were laid in a pile on the table before the [injured person]'.43 
Again, claim agents quickly gathered and then used whatever 
relevant information they could discover. They interviewed doc-
tors who had treated injured persons, apparently violating the 
patients' rights to confidentiality, and obtained valuable medical 
information that could help the company in future lawsuits. More 
immediately, they used such medical information directly, telling 
injured persons about their conversations and claiming that the 
victims' own doctors regarded their injuries as minor or tem-
porary. Similarly, agents interviewed both victims and potential 
witnesses, obtaining additional information both to pressure 
claimants for settlements and to prepare for litigation. Together 
with regular company employees, they asked passengers to sign ' 
reports about the nature and cause of their injuries, securing 
potentially powerful admissions to undercut subsequent claims. 
Their efforts, too, were comprehensive. They insisted on getting 
releases even from those who believed they had not been injured 
or who disclaimed any desire for compensation. The agents 
pressed them to accept token payments in order to cover possible 
injury to their clothing, parcels, or baggage; they insisted that 
they take small amounts of money to compensate for whatever 
'expenses' or 'inconveniences' they might have suffered. Some-
times, the agents offered the money as a purported 'gift' or 'dona-
tion'. The signed agreements that they obtained in return proved 
invariably to be complete releases for claims of all varieties, 
including personal injuries. Frequently, such releases precluded 
subsequent suits by those who later realized or learned that they 
had, in fact, suffered significant injuries. 
41 Dalmage v. Crow, 49 NYS 1004 (City Ct. NY 1898). 
42 Logue v. Philadelphia RapUJ Transit Co., 78 Pa. Sup. Ct. 239 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1922). 
43 Barrett v. Lewiston, Brunswick & Bath Street Railway Co., 85 A. 306, 308 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 
Me. 1912). 
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A 1929 Texas case was both typical and revealing. In Bankers' 
Health & Accident Co. ef America v. Shadden, 44 the court found that 
an agent's own testimony 'conclusively demonstrated' his fraudu-
lent behaviour. He had preyed 
upon a widow of limited education without training in matters of busi-
ness, wholly unacquainted with the exclusions, inclusions, and highly 
technical phrases of an accident insurance policy, with practically no 
understanding or comprehension of the facts involved, or her legal rights 
thereunder, and over whom the clouds of bereavement, by reason of her 
husband's recent death, were still hovering. 
Among other statements, the agent admitted telling the woman 
that he had studied the policy and that it simply did not cover her 
husband. He threatened that 'if you don't make a settlement with 
me, you are going to have to fight with my company and they are 
not going to pay you a dime'. He insisted further that 'if you go 
to an attorney with this, your attorney won't get enough of it to 
pay their [sic] fee'. Finally, as his emotional coup de grace, he 
informed the grieving widow that 'where there is any doubt about 
an accident they remove the body from the grave and have it 
examined'.45 Two aspects of the case are particularly significant. 
First, the agent testified freely about his tactics, evidencing his 
belief that they were wholly ordinary and legitimate. Second, he 
also testified that he had been a claim agent for twenty-six years.46 
Together, those two facts suggest that manipulative and unscrupu-
lous practices were in common use and that they affected thou-
sands upon thousands of victims whose claims never reached the 
courts. 
Innumerable cases support those conclusions. It was a railroad's 
division superintendent, for example, who secured a release within 
eighteen hours of an accident by twice meeting with a woman 
who had a fractured shoulder blade and was in a state of shock.47 
An agent with fifteen years' experience secured the release of a 
woman's claims by bringing her husband's supervisor to the 
meeting where he negotiated the settlement. The supervisor, who 
'had authority to retain or discharge' the husband, told the wife 
44 Bankers' Health & Accident Co. of America v. Shadden, 15 SW 2d 704 (Ct. Civ. App. Texas 
1929). 
4
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47 Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railwqy Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 120 (Sup. Ct. Ill. 1884). 
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that 'it would be better for them to sign the release'.48 Again, it 
was the 'chief special claim agent' of an insurance company who 
felt free to adopt an even more dramatic tactic. Trying to settle a 
$2,500 life insurance policy for $soo, the agent left the attorney 
of the widow-beneficiary and, contrary to his promise, went 
directly to the woman's home. Alone with her, he used a series of 
false statements and threats to coerce a release. 49 
The fourth major characteristic of corporate settlement prac-
tices-especially of railroad and streetcar companies-was the 
maintenance of company hospitals and doctors. Claim agents sent 
or accompanied injured persons to company physicians and facil-
ities, and in countless other cases company doctors turned up at 
the accident scene or, shortly thereafter, visited victims at their 
homes or hospitals. In some cases, even though injured persons 
had already received emergency medical care or were under treat-
ment by their own physicians, the company doctors came to 
examine and treat them anyway. 
The ready availability of medical care minimized victims' suf-
fering and often prevented more serious injuries, but the benevo-
lence was grounded in well-understood corporate interests. 
'Medical and hospital service', a railroad accounting handbook 
explained, 'is of the nature of preventive measures to avoid when 
possible more serious injuries or fatalities with the consequent 
heavier damages. '5° Company doctors were also superb discovery 
instruments. By conducting their own examination of victims, 
they prepared themselves to testify on the basis of first-hand 
knowledge and gained critical information that would otherwise 
have been unavailable to their companies prior to trial. Finally, 
and probably most important, by becoming the victims' physicians 
and tending their injuries, company doctors earned both their 
gratitude and their confidence. When they advised patients that 
their injuries were minor or temporary, they eased their worries 
and raised their hopes. When they supported, directly or indi-
rectly, the constant importuning of the ever-present claim agents, 
they helped induce their patients to settle on the agents' terms. 
The cases suggest that injured persons were often susceptible to 
48 Peterson v. A. Guthrie & Co., 3 F. Supp. 136, 137 (DCWD Wash. 1933). 
49 Harms v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. ef New York, 157 SW w46, w48, w49 (Ct. App. Mo. 
1913). 
50 Eaton, Handbook, 190. 
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the doctors' lead. Hurting, shocked, and distressed, they desper-
ately wanted to believe that they would recover fully and that they 
would shortly be back about their lives as if nothing had hap-
pened. When company agents and doctors told them that their 
injuries were 'minor' and 'temporary', injury victims seized hun-
grily on such welcome news. Pressed to make decisions quickly, 
they often opted to accept the happy future that was promised, or 
at least dangled as a likelihood, and to go ahead and take the set-
tlement offered. 
In many cases company doctors participated in the effort to 
obtain releases from their patients. Sometimes they initiated nego-
tiations themselves, informing patients that they were not seriously 
injured and urging them to settle quickly. Sometimes they intro-
duced their patients to claim agents, and sometimes they merely 
advised them to go and see the agents. Sometimes, apparently 
when they were not formally company 'employees', they joined 
with claim agents to seek quick releases so that the company would 
pay for their services immediately. Such efforts nudged injury 
victims towards settlement and, in many cases, gave them the 
impression that accepting the agents' offer was the best-or only 
-option available. 
While company doctors did not always encourage settlement, 
they were apparently expected never to discourage it. The 
Supreme Court of Kansas focused on some critical testimony. 
Several witnesses testified that the company doctor had told them 
that his patient had come 'within a hair's breadth of breaking his 
neck' and that he had 'intended to warn him against signing a 
release of the railroad company'. He had not done so, however, 
the doctor explained, because 'the claim agent was so near at hand 
that he had no chance'.51 
The intrinsic conflict of interest that plagued company do~­
tors repeatedly created situations that were at best ambiguous. 
Company doctors made mistaken diagnoses and rendered opin-
ions that proved to be overly optimistic, and they apparently failed 
frequently to warn their patients about the dangers of future com-
plications and disabilities. Even assuming their most scrupulous 
good faith, they regularly and directly advanced their companies' 
interests by the frequent support they gave for immediate settle-
51 Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Goodholm, 60 P. 1066, 1068 (Sup. Ct. Kan. 1900). 
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ments. With surprising frequency, the courts found that company 
doctors had engaged in fraudulent behaviour and that they had 
purposely or recklessly misled their patients in order to obtain 
releases. 
Social variations: gender and race in the 
iriformal legal process 
While company agents used a variety of tactics against mJury 
victims, it seems likely that they were particularly effective in 
securing releases from women and especially from blacks. 52 The 
cases show that women were often subjected to some of the 
agents' most intrusive and manipulative tactics. In a collision that 
occurred around one or two in the morning, for example, agents 
of one railroad pressured an injured woman all night long while 
she 'was laboring under great nervous strain'. In addition to her 
own injuries, 'she was greatly distressed and excited' because 
'[h]er infant was injured about the head'. After hours of effort, 
the agents finally secured her signature on a release 'about day-
break'. 53 The Supreme Court of Illinois described another female 
passenger who 
was in her private room at the hotel, suffering at the time the most 
intense pain, was partly disrobed, and was being attended by a lady,-a 
casual acquaintance,-who had been applying liniment to her person, 
and was then combing her hair, when two strange men entered the room 
to secure her signature to the paper.5+ 
Another railroad agent arrived at a widow's home less than two 
hours after she had viewed her husband's 'mutilated remains' 
which had been found 'scattered along the track, the hands at one 
place, the head at another, and the liver at another'. When she 
confessed to the agent that her 'one thought' was to have her 
husband's remains buried at his old home in another county, the 
agent immediately seized the opportunity. He told her that 
52 Cf. Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman, 'Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining 
for a New Car', American Economic Review, 85/3 (1995), 304-21. 
53 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Reilly, 161 SW rn52, rn53 (Sup. Ct. 
Ark. 1913). 
54 Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Lewis, rn9 Ill. 120, 132 (Sup. Ct. Ill. 
1884). 
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if she did not sign a release to the railroad company, she would have to 
bury her husband at her own expense; that he was in a hurry to get back 
and notify the undertaker; that it was too great expense to bury her 
husband at his old home; that the railroad company would do nothing 
towards burying her husband but would 'hands off' unless she would 
sign a release. He also stated that the railroad company was not liable 
to her. 
All of the agent's statements, the Supreme Court of Georgia sub-
sequently found, were false. 55 
If agents tried more often to bully and intimidate women, 
female claimants who subsequently took their claims to court 
sometimes received a particularly sympathetic hearing. The courts 
often showed solicitude for widows, and they appeared willing to 
give relatively heavy weight to the argument that women were not 
responsible for signing releases because they possessed little or no 
business experience. A Kentucky court affirmed a verdict for a 
female plaintiff on the ground, inter alia, that she 'had no male 
friend present to advise her' when she signed a release,56 and the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota did the same for a woman who 
'was away from her husband and without legal advice'. 57 
While gender sometimes won judicial sympathy for fem ale 
plaintiffs, it often made no difference. Many women claimants 
received not a whit of special consideration. The courts often 
upheld the releases they contested, even when the circumstances 
were dubious. Although the nature of the evidence makes any 
conclusions tentative, it seems likely that claim agents frequently 
exploited the special vulnerabilities of female injury victims and 
that the courts remedied their abuses only erratically. 
If women were relatively vulnerable to agent tactics, blacks suf-
fered even more, especially in the South. First, as a practical 
matter, the opportunity for blacks to pursue tort claims was prob-
lematic and even dangerous. Repression, intimidation, and vio-
lence were integral parts of southern race relations; and blacks 
knew all too well the risk of off ending whites for 'not knowing 
·" Hixon v. Georgia Southern & Florida Railway Co., 137 SE 260, 261 (Sup. Ct. Ga. 1927). 
51
' Southern Railway Co. in Kentucky v. Brewer, w8 SW 936, 937 (Ct. App. Ky. 1908). 
57 Clark v . .Northern Pacific Railway Co., 162 NW 406, 409 (Sup. Ct. ND 1917). See Barbara 
Y. Welke, 'Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870~1920', 
Law and Social Inquiry, 19 (1994), 369~403. 
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their place'. 58 Filing an action that reflected badly on a local 
white-a small businessman, a corporate employee involved in the 
injury, or a claim agent responsible for settling the matter-could 
provoke social abuse, economic retaliation, or physical violence. 
Second, most blacks were relatively poor and uneducated, and 
they suffered as a group from high illiteracy rates. The inability 
of large numbers to read and write increased their vulnerability 
to white dishonesty. A black sharecropper who signed a highly dis-
advantageous contract remembered the lesson. '[I]f you didn't 
understand it', he explained, 'they just took advantage of your 
ignorance. '59 Finally, most blacks looked on what they called 'the 
white folks' courthouse' with deep scepticism, if not outright hos-
tility.60 In many southern and border states blacks could not serve 
on juries, while black witnesses subjected themselves to unknown 
extra-legal dangers and, in any event, risked the cold disbelief of 
white juries.61 There was also reason to believe that white juries 
would not award large judgments to black plaintiffs.62 Further, in 
order to dare a court case blacks had little choice but to retain 
white attorneys. As one white southern attorney remarked: 'Negro 
lawyers do not get "good breaks" before white juries. '63 Thus, haz-
arding a lawsuit would most likely require a black to trust a white 
attorney, as well as a white judge and white jury. Small wonder 
that in his classic study, An American Dilemma, Gunnar M)rrdal con-
cluded that as a practical matter most southern blacks were 
'restricted to trying to settle things outside of court'. 64 
·
111 
'To lodge a complaint against a white person was also to invite harassment and some-
times violence.' Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aflermath ef Slavery (New York, 
1980), 285. 
59 Theodore Rosengarten, All God's Dangers: The Life ef Nate Shaw (New York, 1975), 151. 
See David M. Katzman and William M. Tuttle, Jr. (eds.), Plain Folk: The Life Stories ef Undis-
tinguished Americans (Chicago, 1982), 157. 
tin Quoted in Gunnar Myrdal with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose, 
An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem in Modern Democracy (New York, 1944), at 537. 
61 Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law (New York, 1910), 
253-77; Myrdal, American Dilemma, 549-50; Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long, 287; Katzman 
and Tuttle, Plain FOik, 181. 
i;, Maxwell Bloomfield, 'From Deference to Confrontation: The Early Black Lawyers of 
Galveston, Texas, 1895-1920', in Gerard W Gawalt (ed.), The New High Priests: Lawyers in 
Post-Civil War America (Westport, Conn., 1984), 159. 
63 Quoted in John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (1st pub. 1937; 3rd edn., 
Garden City, NY 1957), 262. 
64 Myrdal, American Dilemma, 528. Accord WJ. Cash, The Mind ef the South (1st pub. 1941; 
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Given those conditions, it seems almost certain that corporate 
claim agents, who lived on their ability to secure cut-rate releases, 
leaned frequently and heavily on the lever of race. 'Any white man 
can strike or beat a Negro, steal or destroy his property, cheat him 
in a transaction and even take his life, without much fear of legal 
reprisal,' Myrdal summarized. 'The minor forms of violence-
cheating and striking-are a matter of everyday occurrence. 'G5 
Race relations, especially in the South, created an ideal context 
in which claim agents could ratchet up the social pressures they 
applied and secure drastically discounted settlements. When 
cornered by a white man and asked to sign an employment 
agreement, a southern black reported, '[w]e would have signed 
anything, just to get away'.66 
Especially striking was the aftermath of a Seaboard Air Lines 
wreck in North Carolina in 1g1r. A special excursion train, sched-
uled for the annual outing of the St Joseph's African Methodist 
Episcopal Sunday School, carried g12 blacks packed into seven 
wooden coaches that had been designed to hold fifty people each. 
When the special crashed into a slow-moving freight, ten blacks 
were killed and another eighty-six injured, fifty-eight seriously. 
The Seaboard was clearly responsible for the wreck and had no 
legal defence to its passengers' claims. Immediately, the railroad 
dispatched agents to the scene, and a local paper reported that 
the resulting settlements ranged from $1 to $1,ooo.G7 Contempo-
raneously, a congressional study found that tort judgments for 
injured railroad workers averaged more than $goo in cases involv-
ing temporary injuries, $z,500 in death cases, and from $4,000 to 
$n,ooo in permanent disability cases. 68 Apparently, therefore, the 
Seaboard's agents secured discounts of 80 to go per cent of the 
judgment value of the claims. 
More revealing is the fact that the Seaboard's payments were 
low even compared to other out-of-court settlements. Such settle-
ments, of course, were almost invariably lower than judgments, 
and the same congressional study found that they averaged 
approximately $70 for temporary injuries, $1,200 for both per-
65 Myrdal, American Dilemma, 559· 
,;c; Hamilton Holt (ed.), Life Stories ef Undistinguished Americans as Told by Themselves (New 
York, 1906), 191. 
67 Katie Letcher Lyle, Scalded to Death by the Steam: Authentic Stories ef Railroad Disasters and 
the Ballads that were Written about Them (Chapel Hill, NC, 1991), 79-80. 
611 Sen. Doc. 338, 62 Cong., 2 sess. (1912), i. 131, 135, 139, 143. 
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manent partial disability and death claims, and just under $4,000 
for claims of permanent total disability. 69 Two powerful forces, of 
course, helped keep those worker settlements relatively low: first, 
employers often threatened their employees with sanctions, 
including the loss of jobs, if they did not settle their claims readily; 
and, second, employers had a battery of special legal defences that 
made employee claims particularly unpromising. 70 The blacks 
injured and killed in the Seaboard wreck, in contrast, confronted 
neither of those compelling pressures and, indeed, occupied a 
commanding legal position because the railroad seemed clearly 
at fault. Regardless of those facts, however, the black passengers 
apparently settled for amounts significantly lower than those that 
the railroad workers obtained in their out-of-court agreements. 
Indeed, the blacks in the Seaboard wreck obtained much less than 
another group of passengers had received more than thirty years 
earlier. In 1880 the West Jersey Railroad settled forty claims on 
behalf of eighteen dead and twenty-two injured passengers for an 
average of $1,270 per claim, probably at least double or triple the 
average amount the blacks received. 71 
While the calculus of race placed black tort victims at a steep 
disadvantage, it did not invariably deny them justice. Conditions 
varied widely across the nation and even in the South, and the 
legal options available to blacks may have improved somewhat 
after the 1920s. Further, those known to be 'good blacks' and those 
who had white 'sponsors' were sometimes treated with benevo-
lence. Those fortunate enough to obtain able white counsel and 
get into court-at least on claims with no 'racial' overtone-could 
sometimes succeed in winning relief. Indeed, black passengers 
injured on trains owned by foreign corporations probably had a 
relatively decent chance of prevailing. Reported release cases 
involving blacks-few in number-suggest that southern and 
border state courts would on occasion find in favour of blacks 
who seemed truly deserving, especially if they were old, severely 
injured, obviously overreached, and-perhaps-female. 
The relatively small number of release cases involving blacks, 
however, together with the evidence of general racial repression 
0
" Ibid. 131, 135, 139, 14g. 
70 Purcell, Litigation and Inequality, 38-41, 72-82; Bergstrom, Courting Danger, 158-6o. 
71 Ro be rt B. Shaw, A History of Railroad Accidents, Sqfety Precautions and Operating Practices 
(2nd edn., [n. p.], Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., 1978), 422-3. . 
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and discrimination, supports a simple conclusion. The over-
whelming number of blacks settled their claims out of court, 
received relatively low amounts of compensation, and dared chal-
lenge releases only rarely and only under unusually favourable 
social circumstances. '[N]o one of us', recalled one southern 
black, 'would have dared to dispute a white man's word.' 72 
Using legal rules: policing and counter-crefiing behaviour 
The pressure tactics of company agents and the minimal amounts 
paid in settlements combined to make many judges deeply scep-
tical of releases signed shortly after accidents or in hurried cir-
cumstances. Frequently, they voided such agreements for fraud, 
protecting claimants against many of the agents' most overt and 
deceitful tactics. Given the need to prove 'intentional' misrepre-
sentation and to meet a higher 'clear and convincing' standard of 
proof, however, fraud was difficult to establish. Suspicious courts, 
therefore, often turned to other theories to void dubious releases. 
Increasingly, they used the doctrines of 'mistake' and 'mental 
incompetence'. Both filled the middle ground where serious 
doubts existed about an agent's actions but intentional misrepre-
sentation had not clearly been shown. If misleading statements 
had not been made intentionally, then they had necessarily been 
made on the basis of an erroneous assumption of fact. In such 
event, both parties were mistaken, and the intended agreement 
had not been consummated. Similarly, if injured persons were not 
able to act 'rationally', they lacked the mental competence to enter 
into binding agreements. In either case, their contracts could be 
set aside. 
The irony, of course, was obvious. Corporate agents persis-
tently sought out injury victims as soon as possible after accidents 
and pressed them to sign releases immediately, regardless of their 
physical and mental state and regardless of their ignorance about 
their medical condition. The agents' goal was precisely to deal 
with potential claimants while they were acutely vulnerable and 
to pre-empt suits before they could become aware of the nature 
of their injuries and obtain informed legal advice. Ignoring the 
72 Holt, Life Stories ef Undistinguished Americans, 1 g I. 
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essence of the social practice of corporate release-seeking, courts 
used fictitious concepts of 'mistake' and 'competence'-sporadi-
cally and erratically-to try to limit its overall operation. They 
drew essentially arbitrary lines to police the worst excesses of a 
social practice that flooded broadly beyond their control. 
While the law provided some escape hatches for those who 
signed releases, it also provided corporate attorneys with power-
ful tools to defend many of their agents' most aggressive tactics. 
The 'mere concealment' rule, for example, was often useful. Since 
parties had a duty to read whatever agreements they signed, 
written releases were not voidable for fraud if agents 'merely' con-
cealed the contents as opposed to fraudulently misrepresenting 
them.' [I]f by negligence and indifference to his own interests one 
permits himself to be overreached', explained one court, 'the law 
affords him no redress because his own conduct is blameworthy.' 73 
Agents might succeed in securing legally binding agreements, in 
other words, even though the written document they presented 
contained terms that were different from those they had orally dis-
cussed or promised. If the injured person had an opportunity to 
read the agreement, the 'mere concealment' rule could salvage a 
release from a claim of fraud. 
The 'statement of law' rule was equally serviceable .. 'The law 
is presumed to be equally within the knowledge of all parties,' 
declared an Ohio court, upholding a contested release. 'The 
agent's opinion as to [the claimant's] legal rights, however strongly 
stated, was not a misrepresentation of a fact for the consideration 
of thejury.' 74 Thus, if agents couched their comments and exhor-
tations in legal terms-the victim's 'fault', the company's non-
liability, the legal significance of the alleged facts, or the elements 
that a claimant would have to prove if she went to court-they 
could stay within the law and probably ensure the validity of the 
releases they obtained. 
There was an even more comprehensive rule-the 'opinion' 
rule-that was, understandably, of even greater utility. 'The true 
rule is that the mistake must relate to either a present or past fact 
or facts that are material to the contract of settlement', declared 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 'and not to an opinion as to 
73 Carroll v. United Railways Co. ef St. Louis, 137 SW 303, 309 (Ct. App. Mo. 19u). 
74 The Aetna Insurance Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio NS (DeWitt) 283, 294, 293. (Sup. Ct. Comm. 
Oh. 1877). 
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future conditions as the result of present known facts. ' 75 Artfully 
phrased, or at least testified to, statements about a victim's prog-
nosis, the efficacy of the company's safety precautions, the weight 
due to the victim's testimony, the 'soundness of a doctor's evalua-
tion, and other similar topics could be considered mere 'opinions' 
and, hence, insufficient to sustain a claim of fraud. The rule was 
especially serviceable in defending the optimistic prognoses of 
company doctors and the glowing assurances of their claim 
agents. :A physician's diagnosis is necessarily a matter of opinion', 
wrote one court, 'except in cases where the ailment is external 
and visible. '76 Though sensible in some contexts, the 'opinion' 
rule encouraged ambiguities to thrive where conflicts of interest 
inhered. The rule conferred a sweeping leeway on those whose 
statements served two masters, and it imposed heavy burdens on 
anyone who tried to challenge their craft. As long as agents cast 
their statements as opinions, they could hover in the grey, and their 
companies' attorneys could readily defend their actions. 
Although courts often invoked the 'opinion' rule, they came 
increasingly to limit it after the turn of the century. 77 They seemed 
to grow more sensitive to the wiles of agents and the vulnerabili-
ties of victims. 'The rule that a forecast of what will happen in 
the future is merely promissory, and not a statement of existing 
fact', explained the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1927, 'does not 
apply, where the matter involved is peculiarly within the speaker's 
knowledge.' The court upheld a ruling voiding a release because 
the 'agent was in better position to know the facts about [plain-
tiff's medical condition] than the plaintiff'. 78 Similarly, the courts 
seemed to become more willing to scrutinize records and find that 
statements of opinion actually contained misrepresented or con-
cealed 'present facts' that company doctors knew or should have 
known. Such an interpretation allowed them to avoid the 'opinion' 
rule altogether. 'The gist of fraudulent misrepresentation is the 
producing of a false impression upon the mind of the other party', 
explained the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1913, 'and if this 
"' Simpson v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co., 186 NW 1001, 1003 (Sup. Ct. Neb. 
1922). 
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result is actually accomplished the means of accomplishing it are 
immaterial.' Affirming a judgment for plaintiff, the court noted 
simply that the plaintiff was 'ignorant' and that 'the [company] 
physician had superior knowledge'. 79 
The courts increasingly recognized that experience, knowledge, 
and craft allowed agents to posture their behaviour and frame 
their statements in order to pressure victims to settle while at the 
same time avoiding any obvious, or at least provable, overreach-
ing. 80 They knew, too, that such artfully ambiguous behaviour 
enabled company attorneys to characterize agents' actions in 
legally defensible ways and thereby to maintain the validity of the 
releases they secured. In the early twentieth century, by restrict-
ing such doctrines as the 'mere concealment' and 'opinion' rules, 
many judges began trying to limit the ability of agents to accom-
plish by art what the law condemned in· principle. 
The utility of releases and the scope of the 
informal legal process 
As often as the courts voided releases, their decisions reached only 
a small percentage of the agreements that companies. secured. 
The major social significance of corporate release practices did 
not occur in the frequent cases where courts voided agreements. 
Rather, their principal impact occurred in three other classes of 
cases where the releases prevailed. 
The first was the large class of cases in which the courts did not 
void releases even though the record suggested pressured circum-
stances, agent overreaching, or a victim who had little or no 
understanding of his legal rights, medical condition, or the doc-
ument presented. A New York appellate court refused to void a 
release signed the day after a streetcar accident by an Bo-year-old 
man who had suffered a dislocated shoulder,81 and the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey upheld a release for $roo signed by a pas-
senger who had lost his arm while riding on a streetcar. 82 
79 St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Co. v. Reed, 132 P. 355, 357 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1913). 
80 See, e.g., Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corporation, 68 F. 2d 942, 945 (CCA 2d 1934) (Hand, 
J). 
81 Mcloughlin v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Railway Ca., IOI NYS 196 (App. Div. 4th Dept. NY 
1906). 
82 :(,dancewicz v. Burlington Counry Traction Co., 71 A. 123 (Sup. Ct. NJ 1908). 
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The law of releases, in other words, did not grind exceedingly 
small. '[C] ourts have shown a special disposition to sustain com-
promises of disputed claims', the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
declared in 1915, 'often without much regard to the injustice 
resulting.'83 In Spritzer v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., for example, it 
was uncontested that plaintiff had been injured in a train wreck, 
thrown some IO or 15 feet from the train, carried unconscious to 
a hospital, and placed on the floor on a stretcher in the company 
of approximately 100 other victims of the same wreck. The plain-
tiff testified that he awoke a couple of hours later 'in a kind of 
stupor', that he was 'cold because I was naked', and that he had 
'a very terrible pain in my shoulder'. Finally, it was also uncon-
tested that an agent approached the plaintiff while he was lying 
on the floor and, approximately three hours after the wreck, 
obtained a release. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld 
the agreement on the ground that the plaintiff had not set forth 
sufficient facts to show that he had been 'incompetent' when he 
signed it.84 
The second class of cases where corporate release practices had 
their major social impact included those where the courts refused 
to void releases because the facts showed little or no evidence of 
culpable overreaching. Those cases revealed, instead, simply that 
the victims had acted most unwisely and-for whatever reason-
had settled for inadequate compensation. In these cases it made 
no difference to the courts that the releases were signed within 
days or weeks of injury, that the victims were without knowl-
edgeable advisers, that they might have been influenced by mis-
taken diagnoses of company doctors, that they were injured more 
severely than they had thought, or that they had probably had 
little or no real understanding of the documents they signed. The 
law protected releases that were free from certain identifiable-
and properly proven-types of overreaching, regardless of the 
substantive unfairness of their terms or the gross inequality 
between the parties. In 1914, for example, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas upheld a $10 release, signed two days after a train colli-
sion, and overturned a $2,500 jury verdict for a woman who had 
received permanent internal injuries. 'The settlement was an 
improvident one', the court acknowledged, 'but the plaintiff 
n:i Mclsaac v. McMurrqy, 93 A. 115, 118 (Sup. Ct. NH 1915). 
84 Spritzer v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 75 A. 256, 257 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 19w). 
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entered into it in full possession of her senses and without the per-
petration of any trick or fraud.' 85 
The third class of cases where corporate release practices had 
their major impact was the least visible but by far the largest and 
most important. It was the class where the practice of organized 
release seeking bore its true and most abundant harvest. It con-
sisted of the vast and untold numbers of releases that were never 
challenged in court and, hence, that never surfaced in the reported 
'cases' or left traces in the judicial records. This third class was 
founded on the beliefs of millions of tort victims that the releases 
they signed had terminated any chance of legal recovery. The 
major social impact of corporate settlement practices, in other 
words, occurred outside the courts in a legal process that was 
quick, effective, largely invisible, extremely profitable for the com-
panies, and in every practical sense final and irremediable. 
Exact measurement is impossible, but three basic facts suggest 
the huge size of this third class. Millions of potential tort claims 
arose every year; only a tiny percentage of them were resolved 
judicially; and corporations maintained specialized departments 
devoted to the goal of keeping adverse claims out of court. The 
staggering disparity that existed between the number of potential 
claims and the number of actual lawsuits establishes .that the 
number of out-of-court dispositions was huge, and the extensive 
and methodical nature of corporate practices suggests that 
their claims departments must have been highly successful in set-
tling out of court the overwhelming number of claims against 
them. Those claimants who did challenge releases in court, there-
fore, almost certainly constituted but a minute fraction of the 
total number of tort victims who signed corporate settlement 
agreements. 
Those who signed releases were, of course, severely disadvan-
taged in any subsequent attempt to assert their original claim. 
Before they could even attempt to present their case on the merits 
they would have to convince a court to void the release. That 
required them to establish fraud, mental incompetence, or mutual 
mistake-all of which required a substantial legal and practical 
effort. Equally important, they faced a series of procedural 
obstacles designed to protect the integrity of releases. Many 
85 Kansas Ciry Southern Railway Co. v. Armstrong, 171 SW 123, 125 (Sup. Ct. Ark. 1914). 
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jurisdictions required them to attack releases only in a separate 
suit in equity. That requirement imposed on them the burden of 
prosecuting two suits instead of one, a burden that increased their 
costs, delayed their action on the merits, and often deprived them 
of a jury on the critical questions at issue. Similarly, most courts 
held claimants to a particularly high standard of proof. The need 
to prevail by 'clear and convincing' evidence compounded 
claimants' problems of proof, warning them of the need to locate 
more and better witnesses and increasing their overall risk of ulti-
mate failure. Finally, many courts required claimants to tender 
back to defendants the money paid pursuant to the releases. 
Though a seemingly minor procedural matter, the tender require-
ment could impose significant hardships on poorer claimants, 
create a technical defence that could complicate or even bar their 
action, and, in some cases at least, prevent those who lacked funds 
from even getting into court. 
That combination of legal and practical burdens undoubtedly 
discouraged large numbers of injured persons who came to regret 
their original settlements and belatedly considered the possibility 
of taking legal action. The major de facto function of releases, 
then, was not to block claims in court, but to dissuade claimants 
from ever attempting to seek relief in any court. 
Conclusion: peering outside the courts 
An examination of corporate settlement practices during the 
period from 1875 to 1945 suggests a number of conclusions. First, 
the release cases support the proposition that tort victims as a 
group received drastically discounted compensation for their 
injuries, that corporations extracted substantial benefits from the 
overall de facto process of claims disposition, and that the law 
allowed-and in some ways encouraged-those results. It would 
be impossible to quantify in any precise way the overall economic 
impact of this claims disposition process, and any complete 
accounting would have to include a range of discounting factors 
and a variety of other costs, including those unfairly or improp-
erly imposed on corporate defendants. Still, the organization, 
numerical scope, and frequent ruthlessness of corporate settle-
ment efforts suggest both that the methodical practice of release 
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seeking constituted a highly effective way of minimizing overall 
corporate costs and, further, that in its direct economic impact on 
ordinary Americans the practice far overshadowed the impor-
tance of formal legal processes. The de facto system of corporate 
release seeking harmed tort victims seriously and benefited cor-
porations substantially, and it rendered the common law tort 
system of the period highly inefficient.86 
Second, the study of corporate settlement practices highlights 
the paradoxical and ambiguous nature of freedom of contract. A 
wondrous instrument of liberty, creativity, and material progress, 
contract was also a duplicitous and ruthless tool of coercion, 
oppression, and exploitation. Too often its proponents-like its 
detractors-saw only one side of its power. In the period from 
1875 to 1945, largely congruent with the so-called 'Lochner era', 
courts and commentators praised contract fervently, but they also 
began to recognize its oppressive uses and tried increasingly to 
limit them. 
Third, the study also suggests more broadly that 'costs' are not 
only unavoidable burdens that occur in all human endeavours but 
also tools that arc sought out, created, magnified, and-above 
all-used. 'Litigation' is neither an abstract nor wholly rule-bound 
process. Rather, it comprises an infinite variety of actions-legal 
and extra-legal as well-that clients and their attorneys take in 
order to pressure their adversaries to discount or abandon their 
claims. Corporate claim departments used the feared costs of lit-
igation as a threat to persuade injured persons to discount or 
forsake their claims. They used the burdens of actual litigation to 
drive up the costs of pursuing those claims in order to serve the 
same purpose. They used releases to add new obstacles-
economic and social-to the paths of tort victims who might 
subsequently be tempted to revive their claims. The study of 
litigation costs requires not only the study of generalized and eco-
nomically inevitable 'transaction costs' but, more importantly, an 
examination of 'strategic and tactical costs'-the costs that 
lawyers discover, create, magnify, manipulate, and exploit. 
Fourth, examination of corporate settlement practices shows 
"" See I. I~ L. Png, 'Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care', Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 34 (1987), 61-85; A. Mitchell Polinsky, 'The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and 
Trials', International Review of Law and Economics, 8 (1988), w9; Hylton, 'Litigation Costs and 
the Economic Theory of Tort Law'. 
534 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR. 
that both empirical studies of judicial caseloads and analytic the-
ories about the 'selection' of cases for litigation, settlement, and 
trial need to be deepened and contextualized. This study shows 
that the interests and practices of institutions and groups helped 
shape the contours of the out-of-court settlement process. Settle-
ments did not occur randomly or accidentally. Rather, they had 
distinct patterns depending on the nature of the parties and the 
types of claims involved, and changing social factors were critical 
in shaping those patterns and determining their practical results.87 
Understanding the nature and distribution of judicial caseloads 
and the process by which cases were 'selected' for litigation or set-
tlement requires an understanding of the social interests and insti-
tutions at work in any given historical period, not merely a logical 
analysis of timeless probabilities about the litigation options of 
abstracted 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants'.88 
Fifth, the study of corporate settlement practices also shows 
that in some socio-legal contexts the ostensibly applicable sub-
stantive law may have little or no effect on the content of private 
agreements. In spite of the law's varied impact in other contexts, 
it had only an oblique and contingent relationship to the settle-
ment agreements that corporate agents secured. Any study of the 
social or economic impact of legal rules, in other words, must 
examine both the extent to which various specific types of actors 
were able to avoid those rules as well as the extent to which they 
were able to use them in ways that went beyond their formal pur-
poses. Legal rules were not self-executing, and in the great major-
ity of disputes they were never judicially applied. Consequently, 
there is no a priori reason to assume that they determined, shaped, 
or even affected the out-of-court settlement of any individual case 
or any particular class of cases.89 
Sixth, this study also highlights the fact that 'difficult' cases, 
'ambiguous' situations, and 'disputed' facts do not always just 
117 Sec, e.g., the discussion of 'social litigation systems' in Purcell, Litigation and Inequality, 
248-50. 
"" Barry Nalcbuff, 'Credible Pretrial Negotiation', Rand Journal ef Economics, 18 (1987), 
197-210; Marc Galantcr and Mia Cahill, '"Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements', Stanford Law Review, 4£i (1994), 1339;John C. Harsanyi, 'Games 
with Incomplete Information', American Economic Review, 85 (1995), 291. 
"'' e.g. Samuel R. Gross, 'The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litiga-
tion', Michigan Law Review, 85 (1987), 734-57. C( Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, 
'Beyond the Great Divide: forms of Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life', in A Sarat 
and T R. Kearns (eds.), Law in Everyday Life (Ann Arbor, 1993), 21-61. 
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happen. Rather, they are often created and sometimes systemati-
cally cultivated. By seeking quick releases-by dealing with 
injured persons when they were alone, in pain, without counsel, 
under medication, and ignorant of the true extent of their 
injuries-corporate agents chose to operate in a grey area where 
ambiguities not only would abound by nature but could also thrive 
by design. By artfully crafting their behaviour and statements to 
remain arguably within the limits of certain legal rules-the 
'opinion' rule or the 'mere concealment' rule, for example-they 
could ensure that their actions would be legally defensible, regard-
less of the calculated de facto pressures or misconceptions they 
generated. As organized and experienced parties, in other words, 
corporate agents learned to play in the grey, and their companies 
profited from the results.90 
Finally, though this study only glances at the formal law, it sug-
gests the amazing constitutive power of legal language and doc-
trine. The law of releases helped define .and animate the ideology 
of the 'free' and 'rational' economic individual. In a context where 
organization, sophistication, and calculation confronted igno-
rance, confusion, desperation, and pain, the law presumed fair-
ness, knowledge, capacity, and mutuality. Establishing those ideal 
qualities as 'normal', it required parties who would attack releases 
to prove by 'clear and convincing evidence' that their situations 
were aberrational. Absent such proof of fraud, the law forced 
them to speak of 'incompetence' and 'mistake' in situations where 
neither of those concepts fairly or realistically captured what had 
in truth occurred. Therein lay a powerful act of creation. 
"" Some statutes tried to restrict the use of releases. Sec, e.g., Thorne v. Columbia Cab Co., 
3 NYS 537 (City Ct. NY 1938). 
